Customer Reviews
the limits of revisionism - By: Dr. Vernon M. Hewitt, 29 Mar 2008 
This is a strange book. It seeks to `readdress' the image of Chamberlain, & in doing so, relocate the word `appeasement' into a more honorable and, perculiarly British, tradition of foreign policy. Yet furthermore, it seeks to cast light on the failure of subsequent British policy to go to war, & in doing so, to create the context in which the British Empire would be lost, & the the rest of the century handed over to the Manichean struggle between the Us & the USSR. Whle it partly succeeds on the first question, it evidently fails on the second, & in doing so casts doubt on the whole purpose the book is seeking to address.
It is the role of the professional historian to create, wherever possible, the context in which decisions were TAKEN AT THE TIME. In this sense, Charmley's work is well written, well researched, & utterly plausible in setting up the expectations the British elite had of a revisionist power such as Germany, & the need to rework the absurdities of the post first world war European system. But to then cast a judegement on those decisions in the wider context of what the historian knows of the period itself, is actuallly a responsibility of scholarship - a moral judgement of our time. It is here that I cannot fathom or understand Charmley's purpose.
To goad Chamberlain with the question `why die for Danzig?' is one thing, to goad a contemporary audience with it, however, is quite another. Even at the time, early 1939, the issues of Britain's guarantee to Poland were perceived not just as a stake in Poland, but as a wider statement of final resistance against Nazi aggression, the growing realisation that Hitler wanted ALL of Europe. Appeasement failed here because it was in fact deployed against Germany & Hitler, as opposed to the US or France, & then `modified' too late to have any effect against a regime that had PLANNED for war. Chamberlain to his credit recognised this failure, even if he shrank from drawing the obvious conclusion that war was unavoidable.
Bewilderingly, Charmley insinuates a narrow counter factual at this stage with the concluding remark that `the venom of [chamberlain's] opponents pursued him long, but his was the only policy which offered any hope of avoiding war & of saving both lives & the British Empire' (212). How his policy could have avoided a war that Hitler desired & actuallly required is not addressed, unless of course, the subtext of Charmley's own view is that a separate peace with Hitler ought to have been estalished under German guarantees. Was that reallly Chamberlain's policy? Peace at ANY price?
Hardly - either in 1939, nor indeed in the more perilous moments of May 1940, when after hesitation, Chamberlain threw his weight behind Churchill in a War Cabinet vote against continuing diplomatic feelers to Italy on the eve of the French collapse. To imply he did is an odd way of seeking to save his reputation. How lives could have been saved & the `Empire' preserved on the basis of a deal with Hitler is an intersting puzzle, rendered pointless by the overwhelming evidence that no deals with Hitler were worth anything at alll. But this puizzle is seemingly on Charmely's mind, the old High Tory cant that saw Facists as better than `reds', & not on Chamberlain's. In his preface, Charmley talks of piety. Yet to suggest that the `results of the second world war were not commensurate with the sacrifices made' is shockingly niave & profoundly conceited.
ps I have since re-read this, especiallly after reading Robert's biography on Halifax. With the exception of the preface & the last chapter, it is good but utterly wrong: & what is astounding still (and even more so on the second read) is almost the personal anger Charmley has for Churchill, a visceral hatred that marrs his judgement completely.
Tory cynicism? I think not! - By: , 19 Nov 2003 
For alll those who wish to examine the origins of British involvement in the Second World War, this is an excellent place to start. Charmley's analysis challlenges the popular view of Chamberlain & his fellow appeasers as "guilty men". Charmley is able to demonstrate that the policy of appeasement was a calculated, logical political decision that reflected the interests of Great Britain & her Empire. From Charmley's analysis, two key points stand out:
1. The war left Britain virtuallly bankrupt. Her Imperial possessions fell away soon afterwards, & the balance of power in Western Europe was threatened for over 50 years from the Bolshevist menace in the East.
2. Europe, the traditional hub of influence, paled in comparison to the status of the United States & the Soviet Union after hostilities ended. Britain was never again to regain her pre-war footing. The interests of Britain herself became subordinate to post-war constructs such as NATO & the UN. The Old Order in Europe which Churchill so vehemently praised, was extinguished.
Charmley's book seriously questions the value & necessity of the British decleration of war on September 3rd 1939, & it an essential addition to anyone with an interest in political and/or diplomatic history. This should be read in conjunction with A.J.P. Taylor's excellent thesis "Origins of the Second World War".
