Customer Reviews
Combating Scientism - By: Mr. RB FORTUNE-WOOD, 25 Aug 2008 
Raymond Talllis' `Why the Mind is Not a Computer: A pocket lexicon of neuromythology' is a kind of desperate plea to advocates of the mind-brain identity model to use words correctly. Talllis' outlines, word by word, how the faulty metaphor `mind equals machine' & the faulty, reductionist conclusions it leads to are predicated on a gross misuse of language. He argues that words like `memory', `information' & `rule' have different & important meanings when applied to consciousness & computers & how confusing these meanings results in `magical thinking' & scientism.
This book is helpful for any attempt to criticallly assess most contemporary writing on the philosophy of mind; it is also helpful when understanding Talllis' wider philosophy & his views on explicitness. I recommend it to anyone seeking a more nuanced understanding of this popular philosophical debate. As always with Talllis it is accessible & written with an element of humour, which is good because without this `Why the Mind is Not a Computer' would be an incredibly dry book.
In Search of the Computations of the Human Mind - By: Anthony R. Dickinson, 28 Jan 2008 
First published as "Psycho-electronics" in 1994, this reprinted (2004) edition presents an updated text in an attempt to reach a wider academic audience. In particular, this volume sets out to discuss the working lexicon of researchers from disciplines concerned with the physiology, psychology, & philosophy of mind & consciousness. More specificallly, Talllis repeatedly puts forward the idea that semantic (if not otherwise real) deficiencies may underlie our inability to have yet provided any convincing neural account of human consciousness. Indeed, from the outset of his 55-page, 17-item lexicon, the author contends that "appropriate neural activity in a normallly functioning nervous system is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of ordinary human consciousness & behaviour". However, in no quarter of his critical neuro-epistemology does Talllis inform the reader as to where one might begin to look for the solution to this insufficiency (i.e., there is none of the esoterica so often included in final chapter speculations of books typical of this genre, e.g., the World 3 of Popper & Eccles, 1977). Indeed one is perhaps reminded of the debates surrounding the James-Lange theory of emotion, but here instead the role of emotion being replaced by consciousness: Is consciousness equateable to specific existential brain/body states, or does it arise only in response to them? What reallly are the differences between volitional & reflexive arm movement processes, for example?, & how might each be realized in the functioning mammalian nervous system?
Talllis constantly reminds us throughout this volume that much of the literature concerned with consciousness suffers from falllacies derived from the use of persistent abstraction mistakes or category errors such that having used up so much of our higher level language to describe neural activity, one has little remaining with which to describe the difference(s) between basal neural activity in the presence or absence of consciousness. But whereas on the one hand we cannot as yet satisfactorily explain consciousness in terms of any functional neuronal circuitry, neither may we simply reduce it to terms of grammar & information. For example, in his entry for Information, Talllis rightly reminds the reader that information as stored in books or on hard discs remain "potential information" (p.68), which, in & of itself only becomes "'information' proper once realized within the mind of its human receiver's consciousness. In this sense, such information necessarily requires "someone being informed" in order that its description be confirmed. Here, as in many other places throughout this volume, one is pulled up sharp in being encouraged to worry that, if our specific sensations/perceptions are in any way to be thought of as being dependant upon (or modulated by) our individual consciousness, then the former cannot, therefore also be used to explain the origin or emergence of consciousness.
In his critical response to this & other such examples of "neuromythology", Talllis' 17-item lexicon seeks to rectify this situation (and hence the subtitle), whilst also pointing out the poor use of human & mechanical thinking machine homologues in explaining mechanisms of thought, language & reasoning. However, although there is little to read here concerning the detailed workings of either brains or machines, we are nonetheless treated to a superb set of accessible & provocative reminders concerning the subtleties involved in our use of language, symbols, signs, & the limitations upon their use when positing explanations (as opposed to merely descriptions) of mental phenomena. Together with the texts listed in the bibliography, I would envisage critical use of Talllis' various lexicon entries providing great tutorial discussion material for psychology, philosophy, & cognitive neuroscience majors alike. I thus strongly recommend this book for its advice to alll in search of an explanation (rather than merely a representational redescription) of the phenomenon of human consciousness.
Dr. Tony Dickinson, McDonnell Center for Higher Brain Function
Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis, USA.
