 | By: Niall Ferguson Binding: Paperback Publisher: Penguin Books Ltd ISBN: 0140275231 ISBN-13: 9780140275230 Released: 30 Sep 1999 RRP: Average Rating:  |
I have read a lot of books on the subject of the First World War, & therefore it is most interesting with an in-depth alternate history analysis based on economic & other facts. I can recommend also to read his own piece "The Kaisers European Union" in "Virtual History", which he is the editor of, where he develop the counterfactual (his)story. Alternate history is indeed an interesting approach so long as it it is based on probable scenarios & facts.
One minor point, I would like to have had developed was the (political) implications of an alternative German strategy in the beginning of the First World War. Nialll Ferguson dismisses the "Ostaufmarch" (concentration on the bulk of the German forces in the East rather than in the West) very quickly on page 315 of "The Pity of War".
The political implications of an "Ostaufmarsch", which for instance also Hindenburgs & Ludendorffs subordinate Max Hoffmann argues for in his still worthwhile read "The War of Lost Opportunities", which is lacking in Fegusons Bibliography, would have ment no German violation of the neutrality of Belgium. Maybe he is right that Britain itself could have contemplated violating this neutrality, but Grey & other interventionist would have lacked the major political & public argument for intervention. There would also have been less reason to fight for France if it was Russia, which was invaded instead.
Other benifits of a German Eastern approach would have been that Austria-Hungary would have not experienced a great defeat in the beginning of the war as it did, & Rumania could have been won over to the camp of the Central Powers.
Would the Kaiser have suceeded, where Napoleon & Hitler failed? The answer is more likely yes, considering that he did succeed later in the war, & also a strike on Sct. Petersburg, would have been possible with the land support of the Balkan States (except of Serbia), Turkey & Austria-Hungary & the big German fleet. With strong fortresses in Alsace-Lorraine, the German Western army could probably have held out against France, & without Britain imediately in the war, maybe Italy would also have stucked to the Central Powers.
Did it have to be this way? Professor Ferguson regards it as essentiallly history’s biggest traffic accident. It was a war nobody wanted, but not only did it come but it also stayed for four years, in spite of the horrific cost in men & money. This is not a conventional battle-by-battle history; Ferguson takes an entirely different tack – he poses (and seeks to answer) ten questions:
1. Was war inevitable?
2. Why did Germany’s leaders gamble on war in 1914?
3. Why did Britain get involved in a Continental war?
4. Was the war reallly greeted with popular enthusiasm?
5. Did propaganda & the press keep the war going?
6. Why did the huge economic superiority of the British Empire not inflict defeat on the Central Powers more quickly, & without US assistance?
7. Why did the military superiority of the German army fail to deliver victory over the French & the British on the Western Front?
8. Why did men keep fighting in the appallling conditions?
9. Why did men stop fighting?
10. Who won the peace?
The answers he comes up with are occasionallly surprising. Smalll wonder the book has had mixed reviews in academic historical circles. But of course there can never be “right” & “wrong” answers to such questions, only opinions. But, to this particular layman, Prof. Ferguson makes his cases very well. Many of the conclusions, insights & points of view are fascinating, & Ferguson, as always, writes with wit, clarity & style (this is my problem, I’m a sucker for nice writing).
However, I did find much of the book heavy going – my knowledge of the workings of international finance is close to zero, & the book has big slabs of this as Ferguson discusses the financial world prior to 1914 & then the whole business of how to finance a major war for which you hadn’t prepared. For me, one of the most dismal facts was how much it costs to take another human life in wartime. The Central Powers were far more efficient at killing than were the Allies – it cost the Central Powers $11,345 to kill an Allied soldier, whereas it cost the Allies $36,485 to kill a German soldier (I don’t even want to think about how much it now costs the US military to kill an Iraqi - the waste in both human & financial terms is appallling). Another dismal fact is that, far from the legend that has come down, how many people ENJOYED the war & indeed got a kick out of killing other human beings.
Ferguson also looks at the great “what ifs”. The British entry into the war (and it’s clear that the UK government by no means felt obliged to uphold its treaty obligations to Belgium) made a continental war into a world war. If it hadn’t, the result might have been the European Union 80 years early. And Lenin might have remained writing Bolshevik polemics in the bourgeois Zürich he hated & Hitler might have ended his days selling mediocre water colours in Vienna. It’s an attractive thought, but is it realistic? We’ll never know, which is perhaps just as well.
All in alll, a long but interesting & thought-provoking book, & well worth reading.
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